

Appendices

Appendix A

Coding Master Narratives, Variables in the Trauma Theory Argument, and Competing Explanations to the Trauma Argument

Liberal Narrative

State of the Union Addresses

A count method (as opposed to alternatives like concordance analysis) was used to measure the liberal narrative in State of the Union addresses. Concordance analysis is good for understanding the clustering of certain phrases in specific documents and may give some sense of patterns in the clustering of phrases/terms over time.¹ While interesting, this is different from the dependent variable in this book, which focuses not on the stability in clustering of terms together over time but changes in strength in a collective narrative. To capture these narratives, the time-honored method of counting the use of words/terms related to liberal political order is more appropriate, especially in highly symbolic documents like State of the Union addresses where presidents are known to carefully choose their words in order to connect with broad national dispositions.

State of the Union addresses vary in length. To control for this, the raw count of words/terms for each speech was divided by the total number of words in the speech. That number was then multiplied by 10,000 in order to get a round number that was better for presentation. For example, in 1913, Woodrow Wilson made nine values references in a State of the Union address that was 3,555 words long. So $9/3555 = .0025$; then $.0025 \times 10,000 = 25$. Twenty-five is the average values reference found in the dataset for that year. This average value

score was used as the measure of the liberal narrative in all statistical models (see tables 2.4 and 2.7).

Two points about time are important. First, terms like “democracy” and “freedom” can differ in meaning for different administrations (i.e., Woodrow Wilson versus George W. Bush). The concern here is not with these differences, but instead with the ebb and flow of the master narrative about promoting liberal goals (regardless of meaning) across time. Second, some might wonder if different eras generate different identity terms, raising potential selection biases. This is less problematic for this particular study. In short, there is a high degree of consistency in the identity terms used in State of the Union addresses (and editorials). The reason probably lies with the fact that the liberal narrative hews so closely to settled, deeply enshrined aspects of U.S. identity. Given its highly revered set of founding documents (Declaration of Independence to U.S. Constitution and Bill of Rights), U.S. political elites often draw on a cohesive set of ideologically liberal language to justify policies in places like State of the Union addresses. This is good for the enterprise here as discourse surrounding the liberal narrative looks very similar from one era to the next. It also means that questionable, temporally specific terms are rare. For terms like these, secondary sources were consulted to determine meaning in deciding whether or not to include them in the counts. By far, the most common term in question here was “civilization,” which was used at times in the early twentieth century. This term was not included in the counting because of its association with social Darwinism rather than liberal identity. As noted, terms related to international economics or movement abroad (for instance, “free” trade or “freedom” of the seas) were also not included, again because the liberal narrative is about political, not economic, order abroad.

Finally, all lame duck addresses ($n = 8$) were excluded, since these were essentially farewell speeches and tended to be more about a president's term in office and, hence, not as reliable an indicator of national dispositions and trends. A few presidents made an address to Congress in the State of the Union format shortly after their first inauguration. These were included if there was a discussion of foreign policy in the speech ($n = 6$). In order to compensate for the missing data created by the exclusion of the lame-duck addresses, we interpolated data for these years ($n = 8$). The addition of this data did not alter the results, but allowed us to expand our number of observations in ways that helped avoid problems with degrees of freedom, given the number of hypotheses we tested for each model.²

Figures 2.1 and 2.2 show the liberal narrative as measured in the State of the Union addresses clustered into periods that cover varying numbers of years using a scale. First, a scale was used for the sake of presentation. Notably, the 0–7 scale for the liberal narrative allowed better comparison of changes in the liberal narrative to changes in threat and disillusionment in figures 2.1 and 2.2, which are measured on a 0–3 scale. Nothing is lost with this 0–7 liberal narrative scale in terms of overall patterns in the narrative.³ The average value score for each address (see above) was used to develop the scale:

<u>Average Value Score</u>	<u>Scale Value</u>
0–15	0
16–30	1
31–45	2
46–60	3
61–75	4
76–90	5
91–105	6

106 and higher

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Second, with respect to the clustering of years, a simple rule was adopted to determine where to end one cluster of dates and begin another. If there was a substantial change (40% or higher) in the average number of values references in speeches for two consecutive years or more, we considered that a break from the prior trend in the narrative and, hence, designated the first year of that change as the beginning of a new cluster of dates. We decided to cluster years in figures 2.1 and 2.2 instead of explore year-over-year data largely due to presentation. A graph with ninety-two decision points (i.e., the year-over-year figures) is almost indecipherable when the liberal narrative, threat and disillusionment are considered together.⁴

Editorials

The newspapers chosen for coding represent different regions of the country with different partisan leanings. They include the *New York Times*, *Washington Post*, *Chicago Tribune*, *Richmond Times-Dispatch*, *St. Louis Observer*, *Los Angeles Times*, *San Francisco Chronicle*, and *Dallas Morning News*. There were seven years where coding provided no data on the liberal narrative or any other variables in the trauma argument. For the reasons noted above, data was interpolated for these years.

As discussed in the introduction, normative language about promotion and protecting liberal order abroad (i.e., lesson or moral) is the marker of or shorthand for the broader story at the center of the liberal narrative over time. The codebook for editorials reflects this, then, as it uses normative language to capture the presence and varying degrees of strength in the liberal narrative.

Editorial Codebook for the Liberal Narrative

n the discussion of foreign policy, is the editorial opinion about democracy, human rights, nation building, and/or ideology . . .

-1 = Negative.

(The United States should not try to advance liberal political order abroad or pull back from such endeavors, and avoid ideological contests either in general or in specific instances.)

0 = No mention.

(There is no mention of democracy, human rights, and/or use of ideological language. The editorial appears neither pro nor con on this topic.)

1 = Positive.

(The United States should think about the world through the lens of liberal political order. There might be positive talk of nation and democracy building; or the use of ideological descriptions/labels of other actors in the international system—for example, “Red China” instead of simply “China” or “Communist” Russia instead of the Soviet Union.)

2 = Very Positive.

(The United States should actively promote and protect liberal political order abroad as well as counter competing ideologies, even and especially by using force if necessary.)

Restraint Narrative

Following the lead of William R. Thompson, the restraint narrative was measured via content analysis of diplomatic history sources.⁵ Historians of U.S. foreign policy talk about important national/public dispositions. The restraint narrative is taboos or prohibitions against certain actions (especially related to the use of force) that are drawn from stories told about past events.

It often shows up as simple mantras—like “no more Vietnams”—in the public discourse. These taboos are the moral of the bigger restraint narrative that over time represent the presence and strength of the narrative itself in the here and now.

Coders culled through secondary accounts of U.S. foreign policy history from 1900 to 2011. They asked two questions to determine the presence or not of a restraint narrative in any specific year or set of years.

- 1) “Based on historical accounts, does there appear to be (and/or do leaders sense that there may be) a public aversion to the use of all or some kinds of force abroad?”
- 2) “Is that aversion based on a past foreign policy experience, probably a prior war?”

If the answer to both was in the affirmative, coders concluded that a restraint narrative was present during that year or period of years noted by the historical account(s). Coders were then asked to look at the historical sources to determine the year that a narrative begins and ends. This may be evident in clear dates set by a certain scholar(s) or might be evident in the presence/disappearance in a specific year of the factors in the public discourse that led to the affirmative answer to the two questions above.⁶

Trauma Theory Variables

Threat and disillusionment are coded on a 0–3 scale through content analysis.⁷ As the theoretical discussion on trauma notes, threat and disillusionment are both related to events. Both open space for narration to begin that affects master narrative strength. A public sense of threat and disillusionment serve, then, as the best empirical approximations of the internal and external trauma processes discussed in chapter 1. But the kinds of traumatic events here differ

considerably, hence, it is anticipated that threat and disillusionment manifest themselves in different ways in these measures.

Threat

Threat is about national disposition (determined by geostrategic events) toward others in the international system. The codebook captures this in an intuitively straightforward manner, consistent with the theory in chapter 1. It points to the intersection of events that according to trauma theory contribute to driving up threat perceptions and those (especially, evident in cooperation with others) that moderate the sense of threat. At the low end of threat perceptions (0 and 1), discourse in the selected measures (State of the Union addresses and editorials) makes no mention of foes; dwells considerably on the prominence of peace and security for the nation; and/or dwells exclusively on the common ground and cooperation with other states when specific geostrategic events are mentioned. Higher end threats (2 or 3) involve discourse that mention events as either broad challenges to state security or specific events that mark states or entities as foes or challengers. The most severe threat language talks of foes with no indication of ongoing cooperation; that is, the nation sees an unremitting contestant that cannot be trusted (3). Language, by contrast, that identifies a foe but also discusses either specific ongoing negotiating initiatives or specific areas of coordinated action (i.e., some cooperation) indicates that the nation sees at least some moderation in a challenger, symbolizing a threat that is not quite at its worst level (2). Overall, these different threat levels are reflected in the following codebook.⁸

Perceived Threat (in State of the Union Addresses and Editorials)

0 = No major threat.

(Peace and cooperation are prominent with other actors in the international system.)

1 = Low threat.

(The United States has some differences with other states[s] abroad. But direct security challenges at present are low. The United States may be working toward common ground and cooperation abroad with states it has differences with.)

2 = Clear threat.

(The United States faces a potential or present challenge to its security. This may take the form of actions by a specific adversary[s] or brewing set of circumstances abroad that threaten U.S. strategic interests. Even amid these conditions, efforts to negotiate with adversaries/aggressors to moderate conflict still exist.)

3 = Serious threat.

(The United States faces a danger to its security from an unyielding adversary[s] that is enhancing or trying to enhance its geostrategic position vis-à-vis the United States. There are no signs of cooperation with a foe(s) at this time and war against an adversary[s] might even be underway.)

Examples from State of the Union Address

- 1) The following from Harry Truman's 1951 State of the Union address was coded a "3":

We had hoped that the Soviet Union, with its security assured by the Charter of the United Nations, would be willing to live and let live. But I am sorry to say that has not been the case. The imperialism of the czars has been replaced by an even more ambitious, more crafty, and more menacing imperialism of the Soviet rulers. This new imperialism has powerful military forces . . . The present rulers of the Soviet Union have shown that

they are willing to use this power to destroy the free nations and win domination over the whole world.

- 2) The following from Lyndon Johnson's 1967 address was coded a "2":

The Soviet Union has in the past year increased its long-range missile capabilities. It has begun to place near Moscow a limited antimissile defense. My first responsibility to our people is to assure that no nation can ever find it rational to launch a nuclear attack or to use its nuclear power as a credible threat against us or our allies. I would emphasize that that is why an important link between Russia and the United States is our common interest, in arms control and disarmament. I expect in the days ahead to closely consult and seek the advice of the Congress about the possibilities of international agreements bearing directly upon this problem . . . We are shaping a new future of enlarged partnership in nuclear affairs, in economic and technical cooperation, in trade negotiations, in political consultation, and in working together with the governments and peoples of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

Examples from the Editorials

- 1) The following from the 1940 response of the *St. Louis Post Dispatch* to the State of the Union address was coded a "2":

Mr. Roosevelt's speech is not so much a report on the state of the Union which the President is charged with making at the opening of Congress, but a message on the state

of the world, particularly on the relations of a peaceful United States to a warring world. . . . A year ago, when Mr. Roosevelt spoke of using methods short of war to curb aggressor nations, we urged the President in a series of questions to state what he meant by the term methods “short of war.” Now that wars are raging all over the earth, it becomes more pertinent to ask for a closer definition of our foreign policy. Since Congress is in session, no doubt that question will be pressed.

- 2) The following from the *Los Angeles Times* response to the 1959 State of the Union address was coded a “3”:

When President Eisenhower went before Congress a year ago to deliver his State of the Union Message a Sputnik was in orbit . . . And although there had been more Sputniks and a “planet,” there was also a huge American Atlas orbiting the earth. The same basic threats from without and from within, however, were still there; the need for strength and courage had not changed. The President summarized the challenge by asking the question: “Can government based upon liberty and the God-given rights of man permanently endure when ceaselessly challenged by a dictatorship hostile to our mode of life, and controlling an economic and military power of great and growing strength?” . . . The nation will stand fast at Berlin and like places of peril and seek to prevent war at any location and in any dimension. To do this, “forces of great power and flexibility” must be maintained.

Disillusionment

Disillusionment relates to the nation's disposition and emotional disquiet about its own behavior, specifically public disenchantment with ongoing foreign policy endeavors. Again, this opens space for moderators to narrate in ways that affect master narrative strength, according to trauma theory. Disillusionment is more intuitively elusive to capture than threat. Hence, we turned to the extensive historical literature on World War I and early interwar years to develop the coding scheme here. "Disillusionment" is a common phrase used to describe this period in U.S. foreign policy. In essence, common phrases and terms that historians used (i.e., drawn from their deep assessment of primary sources) to describe increased disillusionment over time were adopted for the codebook. These phrases/terms were categorized into different levels of disillusionment and represent the keywords in the codebook below. In this sense, mild disillusionment (1) is marked by comments about the nerve or resolve of the nation being tested (again, this is what disillusionment looked like in the early stages after World War I began). Disillusionment rises from there with language indicating lost sense of purpose, retreat, and things not going as planned (2). Its highest level (3) includes talk of social divisions, mistakes, or national uncertainty. In short, disillusionment moves from national questioning at the low end to a sense of abject repudiation of and disdain for current foreign policy at the high end.

Disillusionment about Engagement(s) Abroad (in State of the Union Addresses and Editorials)

0 = No disillusionment.

(Little or no division, doubt or uncertainty appears to exist on contemporary U.S. foreign policy.

At most, there may be a vague, passing reference to critics, but the president dwells little on this.)

1 = Mild disillusionment.

(The nerve, will, or resolve of the nation is being tested by present or recent foreign policy.)

2 = Disillusionment.

(Patience is clearly wearing thin for U.S. endeavors abroad. References to things like endeavors taking longer than expected or not going as planned; talk of retreat or isolation might surface.)

3 = High Disillusionment.

(Pessimism and/or division about current or recent U.S. policy abroad are clear. Phrases like uncertainty, doubts, second-thoughts, domestic turmoil, or mistaken policies are used openly to describe present and recent policy.)

Examples from State of the Union Addresses

- 1) The following from Lyndon Johnson's 1967 State of the Union address was coded a "1":

We will stand firm on Vietnam. How long it will take I cannot prophecy. I only know that the will of the American people, I think, is being tested . . . A time of testing, yes. And a time of transition is sometimes slow; sometimes unpopular; almost always painful; and often quite dangerous.

- 2) We coded the following from Richard Nixon's 1971 State of the Union address a "3":

America has been going through a long nightmare of war and division. Even more deeply, we have gone through a long, dark night of the American spirit.

Examples from Editorials

- 1) The following from the 1966 *Los Angeles Times* response to the State of the Union address was coded a “1”:

U.S. determination to stick it out in Vietnam until aggression has been stopped, no matter how much this might cost, has been made abundantly clear. The great majority of citizens supports his determination. At the same time, however, there remains a sense of uncertainty in the public mind about the stakes in Vietnam and about why what happens in that faraway land is so important to the future of America. The U.S. effort is being popularly supported, but it is not necessarily being adequately understood.

- 2) The following from the 2008 *New York Times* response to the State of the Union address was coded a “3”:

The nation is splintered over the war in Iraq, cleaved by ruthless partisan politics . . . Monday night’s address made us think what a different speech it might have been if Mr. Bush had capitalized on the unity that followed the 9/11 attacks to draw the nation together.

Competing Explanations to the Trauma Argument (Tables 2.4 and 2.5)

The competing explanations to the trauma argument were measured in the following ways. The same national threat variable as that discussed above for the trauma argument was used for the realist argument about threat (i.e., national threat perceptions weaken the liberal narrative). The elite-manipulation argument (i.e., elite threat perceptions strengthen the liberal narrative) was

tested using the annual rivalry data from William R. Thompson and David Dreyer.⁹ This data is culled from “historical sources about when and with whom decision makers thought they were in rivalry relationships,” making it an excellent source of elite threat perceptions.¹⁰ The data ranges from 0 to 4. John Owen provides general date ranges that capture when U.S. policymaking elites become ideologically polarized across the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.¹¹ These dates were used to code polarization on a 0 to 1 scale, with 0 representing periods of weak polarization and 1 representing periods of strong ideological polarization. Recession data was used to test the argument about economic strength.¹²

Appendix B

Forceful Regime Promotion, Military Intervention, Master Narratives, and Competing Explanations

The Military Intervention Variables

Military Action

For the military-action variable, we used Richard Grimmett’s data on the use of force by the United States from 1798 to 2004.¹³ For the years after 2004, Grimmett’s coding rules were used to expand the dataset through 2011, using secondary sources and newspaper accounts. We counted the number of military actions being undertaken by the United States in each year from 1900 to 2011. That number is the military-action score recorded annually and used to run all models in tables 2.7 and 2.8.

Promotion Annual

The promotion-annual variable was constructed using Owen's list of U.S. cases of forceful regime promotion.¹⁴ Three changes were made to Owen's coding. First, U.S. military engagement in Thailand in 1962 was removed as a case of forceful regime promotion. We found no evidence that U.S. troops were there to promote regime stability or institutional change in Thailand (i.e., Owen's coding rule). Instead, all U.S. military operations in Thailand were setting-up for intervention in Laos. Second, Owen codes the Korean War as a single case of regime promotion. We coded it as two cases: South Korea (June 1950) as one case, and North Korea (September 1950) as a second. By crossing the 38th parallel, the United States crossed an internationally recognized border into what had effectively become a separate country, North Korea, hence the decision to code it as a separate case. Third, Kuwait in 1991 was added to the dataset as an additional case of regime promotion that Owen did not include in his original coding.

Owen records only the starting year of these interventions and not their length. Start year and end year of the interventions was coded using the rules adopted for the Correlates of War (COW) dataset.¹⁵ Most of the U.S. regime promotion interventions did not involve 1,000 battlefield deaths, hence they were not included in the COW dataset (2007). For the few (Soviet Union 1918, Lebanon 1958, Dominican Republic 1965) that were, we used the dating for length of war provided in the COW. For those that did not, we used the COW rules (excluding the one about 1000 battlefield deaths per year):

Start Date: The day armed hostilities began (this could be before or after the day war was officially declared if declared at all).

End Date: The day that sustained military combat ends. This may be the day of armistice or cease-fire, as long as conflict does not resume or continue thereafter. If it continues, the armistice/cease-fire date was ignored and the end date was the day that military combat ended.

Suspension of Conflict: If combat ended for more than thirty days, yet less than a year, then we coded the first day of that as a suspension date. The day that hostilities resumed, we coded as a resume date. If combat ended for a year or more after a suspension date, then we coded the suspension date as the end to a military intervention entirely.

Finally, to create a promotion-annual score, we added the number of regime promotion interventions that occurred each year. That score was recorded in the dataset and used for the models in tables 2.7 and 2.8.

Promotion Index

The promotion index offers a score of forceful regime promotions based on the number and type of interventions—full-scale, limited, or retreating—undertaken for each year from 1900 to 2011. To construct these annual scores, we started with the list of regime promotion interventions used for building the promotion-annual variable (see above). Each intervention was coded for military robustness (which can change from year-to-year) using the following codebook.¹⁶

1 = Retreating.

(Amid ongoing hostilities and/or in the absence of a peace agreement, cease-fire, or armistice, policymakers intentionally choose to limit a previously full-scale military operation for the goal of regime promotion by either withdrawing troops unilaterally; announcing a full withdrawal date; ending/curbing the use of certain kinds of force.)

2 = Limited.

(An intervention that is carried out using off-shore military operations [like air power or naval bombardments] or with the use of noncombat forces [notably, special operations personnel].)¹⁷

3 = Full-Scale.

(An intervention where combat troops are inserted into a country with no major constraints [other than tactical] on the mission.)

The coded scores for each intervention in each year from 1900 to 2011 were added up, which gave us an annual intervention score. This indexed score—the promotion index—captures both the number and type of interventions in a single variable for each year. The promotion index was used for the statistical models in tables 2.7 and 2.8.

Competing Explanations to the Master Narrative Argument

The competing explanations to the master narrative argument were measured in the following ways. For the geopolitics argument and its attention to changes in elite threat perceptions, we used again William R. Thompson's rivalry index.¹⁸ For elite polarization, we used the same variable as the above when we tested the trauma theory argument and changes in the liberal narrative. Finally, we again adopted recession as a measure of economic strength.


Inter-Coder Reliability

An independent coder (largely blind to the project's content and the primary author's coding) coded all years of the restraint narrative and the intervention index as well as all variables in all years in the State of the Union addresses and editorials. Analyses of inter-coder reliability using Cohen's kappa revealed substantial to nearly perfect reliability. The kappa score for the promotion index was 0.89 and the kappa score for the restraint narrative was 0.84. The kappa

scores for the State of the Union address variables (including the liberal narrative) ranged from 0.72 to 0.82. The kappa scores for the newspaper editorial variables ranged from 0.72 to 0.91. One variable (out of twenty-four total across all eight newspapers) in one paper (disillusionment, *Los Angeles Times*) registered a .56, or moderate inter-coder reliability.

Appendix C

Cross Correlogram: Liberal Narrative and Forceful Regime Promotion



¹ On the concordance method, see Paul Baker, *Using Corpora in Discourse Analysis* (London: Bloomsbury, 2006).

² Contact the author for results from the noninterpolated data. Interpolating data is common in social science research.

³ For graphs comparing year-over-year change in the liberal narrative using the average value measure and the scale value, contact the author.

⁴ The same goes for the decision to start in 1913. The decision of years prior to this made figures 2.1 and 2.2 cumbersome and indecipherable, even with the clustering of years.

⁵ William R. Thompson, “Identifying Rivals and Rivalries in World Politics,” *International Studies Quarterly* 45, no. 4 (2001): 562.

⁶ Thompson, “Identifying Rivals and Rivalries in World Politics,” 562–64. There was some subjectivity for the coders, especially on start and end dates of the restraint narrative. But, as Thompson notes, this is common in coding secondary historical sources on other questions, like the onset and termination of war, alliance relationships, and deterrence attempts.

⁷ A scale of 0–3 creates distinct categories, which helped with inter-coder reliability. Coders were instructed to code to the highest level of threat or disillusionment.

⁸ Consistent with the discussion above, threat coding from all newspapers was averaged to create an annual editorial threat score, which was used for all relevant models. The same applied to disillusionment.

⁹ William R. Thompson and David R. Dreyer, *Handbook of International Rivalries, 1494–2010* (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2011).

¹⁰ Thompson, “Identifying Rivals,” 558–59, 562.

¹¹ Owen, *The Clash of Ideas*, 161–239.

¹² Recession data available at the National Bureau of Economic Research, <http://www.nber.org/cycles/recessions.html>.

¹³ Richard F. Grimmett, “Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798–2004,” Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division of the Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, October 5, 2004, <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/rl30172.htm>.

¹⁴ Owen, *The Clash of Ideas*, 18–21. This list does not include covert operations, which may be used for these ends as well. Covert operations present data collection problems. Because of the fact that we cannot be certain given their secret nature that we have discovered all such covert operations were not included in the data.

¹⁵ Correlates of War Project, *Intra-State War Dataset*, version 4.1 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 2007).

¹⁶ These coding rules parallel definitions by several other scholars. Owen, *The Clash of Ideas*, 274; Bruce W. Jentleson and Ariel E. Levite, “The Analysis of Protracted Foreign Military Intervention,” in *Foreign Military Intervention: The Dynamics of Protracted Conflict*, ed. Ariel E. Levite et al. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), 5–8, 18–19; and Micah Zenko, *Between Threats and War: U.S. Discrete Military Operations in the Post–Cold War World* (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010).

¹⁷ The use of special operations forces fall between combat forces and covert operations. Using these kinds of military personnel (instead of combat forces) involves an intentional choice by U.S. presidents for a lighter, hence more limited, military footprint. To this end, interventions carried on by special operations forces usually involve force deployment levels that are far smaller in terms of numbers of troops than combat operations and presidents sometimes

intentionally limit what special operations forces are allowed to do militarily. For these reasons, we coded regime promotion interventions carried on exclusively by special operations forces as limited. For an example of the limited nature of special operations forces, see David Ignatius, “U.S. Boots Are already on the Ground in Iraq,” *Washington Post*, September 16, 2014.

¹⁸ Some may claim that in order to test a realist hypothesis like this, we need to explore changes in the distribution of international power, not changes in elite threat perceptions. This would be the case, if we were interested in explaining a broader phenomenon related to international relations. But, as many realists agree, an individual state’s decision for war falls into the domain of foreign policy, not international relations. In order to explore realist expectations for foreign policy outcomes like these realists such as Steve Walt turn to elite threat perceptions as the key explanatory variable. Thompson’s rivalry index is just that: a measure of the extent and number of threats that elite policymakers see in the international system at specific points in time. Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987) and Thompson, “Identifying Rivals.”